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To accept or not to accept: Level of moral concern
impacts on tolerance of Muslimminority practices
Magdalena Hirsch1, Maykel Verkuyten1* and
Kumar Yogeeswaran2
1ERCOMER, Utrecht University, The Netherlands
2University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
Living with diversity requires that we sometimes accept outgroup practices that we
personally disapprove of (i.e., tolerance). Using an experimental design, we examined
Dutchmajority groupmembers’ tolerance of controversial practiceswith varying degrees
of moral concern, performed by a culturally dissimilar (Muslims) or similar (orthodox
Protestant) minority group. Furthermore, we examined whether arguments in favour or
against (or a combination of both) the specific practice impacted tolerance. Results
indicated that participants expressed less tolerance for provocative practices when it was
associated with Muslims than orthodox Protestants, but not when such practices elicit
high degrees ofmoral concern. This indicates that opposition towards specific practices is
not just a question of dislike of Muslims, but can involve disapproval of specific practices.
Argument framing did not have a consistent effect on the level of tolerance for the
practices.
InmanyWestern societies, the hotly debated issues around cultural diversity boil down to
concrete practices and behaviours of ethnic and religious minority groups like Muslims
(Cesari, 2013). Shouldwe tolerateMuslim teachers’ refusal to shake handswith parents of
the opposite sex? Shouldwe allow civil servants towear a headscarf towork? Should a city
or state permit the founding of Islamic primary schools? It is around these concrete
questions thatmulticulturalism and livingwith diversity is truly put to the test, andways of
life collide. It is one thing to endorse freedom of speech, but another thing to apply this
freedom to a religious leader calling gays and lesbians inferior people. And it is one thing to
endorse freedom of education, but another to accept religious schools teaching children
undemocratic principles. Yet, tolerance for dissenting beliefs and practices is a key
condition for citizenship and democracy (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Tolerance is not the
absence of prejudice, but rather refers to the acceptance of norms or practices that one
considers wrong, but not beyond bearing (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017).
While people can reject certain practices because of their prejudicial feelings towards
a group, they might also be intolerant of that kind of practice more broadly. For example,
one can resist the idea ofMuslims establishing an Islamic primary school because one feels
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negatively towards Muslims, or because one thinks that religion has no place in education
entirely. Thus, people can object to a particular practice of a group because they dislike
the group or because they disapprove of the practice itself. Group distinctions might be
irrelevant for tolerance of highly offensive acts because such acts are rejected under all
circumstances and independent ofwho is doing it (generic tolerance; Hurwitz &Mondak,
2002). However, peoplemay bemore tolerant of practices of groups that aremore aligned
with the nationalmajority than aminority group engaging in the same actionwhen the act
is of less moral concern (discriminatory tolerance).
In the present work, we examine whether majority members are willing to tolerate
particular controversial practices of Muslim minorities (a culturally dissimilar group)
relative to orthodox Protestants (a culturally similar group). Our aimwas to go beyond the
existing research by testing whether there is greater tolerance for provocative practices
when they are carried out by dissimilar relative to similar outgroupmembers regardless of
the level of moral concern evoked by such practices, or whether such differences would
disappear when the practice involves strong moral concern. While previous research has
focused on majority group members (in)tolerance of specific practices performed by
Muslims (e.g., Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009; Van der Nol,
2014; Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007), it has not considered the possibility that similar
reactions are elicited when such practices are performed by a more culturally similar
group. Furthermore, existing research has not examined whether toleration depends on
reasons for or against acceptance (but see Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2012). Here, we
exploredwhether pro, contra, or dual arguments for a specific practice furthermoderated
the impact of groupmembership and type of practice on tolerance examining the impact
of framing effects on tolerance. We examined these issues using vignettes in an
experiment design involving a large national sample from theNetherlands,which is one of
the most secular countries in the world.
Moral spectrum and type of controversial practice
Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005) proposed that objections towards particular practices
can differ in the extent to which moral concerns are involved (see also Rozin, 1999).
Moralized entities and activities tend to lead to avoidance and rejection rather than
toleration (Ellemers, 2017). In contrast to subjective preferences and social conventions
(Turiel, 2002), people tend to believe that matters of morality are objective, universally
true, and thereby applicable regardless of group boundaries (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen,
2008). Things that are considered right are simply right and what is wrong is wrong,
independent of who is doing it (Turiel, 2002). If, for example, one has a strong moral
conviction that gender inequality iswrong, one is likely to believe that gender inequality is
wrong in all cultures and religions. With moral issues, people focus more on their
principles and ideals rather than on authorities, group differences, and social identities
(Skitka & Morgan, 2014).
Researchers from different fields have shown that people are less accepting of
divergent beliefs and practices that are viewed as moral issues, and that acceptance for
moral issues is less context-sensitive than for nonmoral issues (e.g., Cole Wright, Cullum,
& Schwab, 2008; Ellemers, 2017; Skitka et al., 2005). Seeing an issue as (im)moral tends to
result in greater rejection, independent of the moral emotions that might be involved and
relatively independent of the context (Cole Wright et al., 2008; see also Wainryb, Shaw,
Laupa, & Smith, 2001; Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998). For example, early adolescents
who endorse the value of cultural diversity tend to tolerate practices that raise subjective
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and conventional considerations, but are less accepting of practices that are perceived as
moral transgression (Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2010). These findings suggest that
people may show varying degrees of tolerance towards a culturally similar versus
dissimilar groups’ practices depending on the degree of moral concern evoked by the
practice. Specifically, we expect that if a practice strongly raises moral concerns, people
will not accept the practice regardless of who enacts it. However, for practices moralized
less, majoritymemberswill be less tolerant of a culturally dissimilar group (Muslims in this
work) engaging in the practice compared to more culturally similar group (orthodox
Protestants in this work).
Framing of controversial practices
Tolerance involves a trade-off between reasons to accept dissenting norms and practices
and reasons to reject them (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). Reasons to accept norms
and practices are often linked to civil liberties. For example, freedom of speech is an
important argument for accepting hate speech against aminority group. Thus, oneway in
which people’s tolerance of dissenting practices might be increased is by framing these
acts in terms of civil liberties. However, questions of tolerance are multi-faceted and
typically evoke oppositional arguments as well. Reasons to reject specific practices often
revolve around concerns about harm and social order (Gieling et al., 2012). For example,
people’s attitudes towards hate speech against minority groups such as gays and lesbians
may not only be based on considerations of freedom of speech, but also considerations
about the offence and harm towards targeted individuals. Additionally, people are often
not just exposed to one set of considerations about an issue or problem, but rather to
competing arguments (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). A number of studies have shown
that the impact of any given argument on individuals’ opinions is neutralized by the
introduction of a competing argument that rebuts the first (e.g., Brewer & Gross, 2005;
Sniderman&Theriault, 2004). For example, one study indicated that the level of rejection
of ethnic-specific school policies increased when these policies were framed in terms of
the cost for the majority population, in comparison with when no such frame was used
(Van Londen, Coenders, & Scheepers, 2010). However, when the emphasis on costs was
combined with an argument about the positive implications of educating ethnic
minorities, the level of rejection of the policies was not different than in the condition in
which no arguments were given (but see Gieling et al., 2012). Thus, the effect of one
consideration appeared to be neutralized by introducing a counter-consideration.
In the present study, we did not make specific predictions about the impact of
arguments on tolerance for various religious practices, but rather explored whether
tolerance of controversial practices depended on providing a pro, contra, or dual
argument for tolerating the practice. The central assumption in framing research is that
people are sensitive and responsive to different, often contradictory, considerations about
an issue, making their opinion dependent on the way that the issue is presented (Chong,
1993;Nelson&Kinder, 1996). By framing an issue in a particularway, attention is directed
towards positive or more negative considerations that affect people’s views about the
issue (e.g., affirmative action, welfare policies, and civil liberties; Brewer & Gross, 2005;
Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). However, framing effects
are particularly likely when people have somewhat ambiguous or relatively weak feelings
about a particular issue. In contrast, strong feelings and attaching personal importance to
an attitude make it resistant to change (Howe & Krosnick, 2017). Attitudes tend to be
strong and therefore difficult to change when they reflect moral values and convictions.
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Research has shown that important attitudes are resistant to framing effects (Lecheler, de
Vreese, & Slothuus, 2009). For example, students who attachedmore importance to their
anti-egalitarian attitudes at the start of a course on gender equality were more likely to
successfully resist changing their attitudes towards equal rights as a result of taking the
course (Sevelius & Stake, 2003).
Context of the present research
We examined the level of tolerance people express towards provocative practices
when they are committed by members of two groups that vary on a continuum of
cultural similarity: Muslims and orthodox Protestants (both representing around 5% of
the Dutch population). In general, people are expected to show higher levels of
tolerance towards orthodox Protestants than Muslims engaging in a controversial
practice they disapprove of because the former are less likely to be perceived as a
threat to national norms, values, and beliefs (Wirtz, van der Pligt, & Doosje, 2016).
First, orthodox Protestants have Dutch ancestry, which is not the case for Muslims.
Second, Christianity, and Protestantism in particular, is considered a historical
component of Dutch culture and society, whereas Islam is often perceived as
incompatible with Dutch national identity (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Research
has shown that even non-believing Dutch adolescents express less negative attitudes
towards Christians compared to Muslims (Verkuyten & Thijs, 2010), suggesting that
such differential reactions do not simply refer to religious in-group bias. Furthermore,
Dutch natives are more strongly opposed to political representation of Muslim
immigrants from Turkey as compared to Christian immigrants from Turkey (Verkuyten,
Hindriks, & Coenders, 2016), indicating that religious group membership is important
in people’s judgements. Tolerance is thus expected to be lower when specific
practices are performed by Muslims as compared to orthodox Protestants.
However, as stated earlier, we expect tolerance of specific practices to further depend
on the extent to which a particular practice evokes moral concern. Specifically, we
focused on tolerance of three practices that have been demonstrated to evoke varying
degrees of moral concern among Dutch majority members (Gieling et al., 2010; Van
Doorn, 2015; Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007, 2008): the founding of separate religious
schools, the exclusion of women from religious boards, and the public expression of
views that gays and lesbians are inferior people. Calling gays and lesbians inferior people is
found to be most strongly considered a moral issue because it causes psychological harm
to the people concerned. The exclusion of females was considered less harmful, but goes
against the principle of gender equality, while the founding of religious schools mostly
raised concerns about social integration. The general expectation is that tolerance will be
lowest for the statement denigrating gays and lesbians, followed by the exclusion of
women and then the founding of religious schools, as the latter are the least moralized
practices. Furthermore, since moral criteria are considered absolute, the group
membership of the one performing the disapproved moral act should not matter. Thus,
we expected individuals to be (in)tolerant of the statement denigrating gays and lesbians
irrespective whether it is made by a very dissimilar group like Muslims or a culturally
similar group like orthodox Protestants (generic tolerance). In contrast, we expected
individuals to be less tolerant of Muslims (relative to orthodox Protestants), in particular
when it comes to the founding of religious schools as it is of the least moral concern
(discriminatory tolerance).
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Method
Sample and procedure
The data were collected in May 2016 by the research institute I&O that maintains a panel
that is representative for the Dutch population in terms of age, gender, education, and
province of residence. Panellists were randomly invited via email to participate in an
online questionnaire of a large Dutch University in which we were able to embed a
between-subjects experiment. Sample size was determined before data collection using
the statistical software G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).1 In total, 1,225
Dutch majority groupmembers participated. The majority of the participants (53.3%) did
not belong to any religious community and participants who affiliated with a religious
group mostly belonged to a non-orthodox Protestant denomination (24.2%), followed by
Catholics (19.9%).Menwere slightly overrepresented in the sample (57.1%male) and ages
ranged from 18 to 90 years (M = 56.53, SD = 12.82). The political self-placement scale
(Jost, 2006) was presented at the end of the questionnaire: left (18%), centre-left (18%),
centre (33%), centre-right (16%), or right (15%).
Design and materials
Following previous research, three vignettes were used about specific practices that in
recent years have caused considerable public debate in Dutch society: founding of
religious primary schools, exclusion of women from religious boards, and homophobic
statements by religious authorities. Importantly, these practices have been debated in
relation to both Muslims and orthodox Protestants and have been found to differ in terms
of the moral concerns that they raise (Gieling et al., 2010, 2012; Van Doorn, 2015;
Verkuyten&Slooter, 2007). For example in one study, itwas found that around four in five
adolescents considered the homophobic statement as wrong and harmful, whereas
around one in three considered the founding of Islamic schools to be wrong (Gieling
et al., 2010). Furthermore, in a post-hoc test on a national sample (N = 218) and following
Skitka et al. (2005), respondents were presented with a single-itemmeasure that directly
asked to what extent their moral principles formed the basis of their views on each of the
three practices. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the homophobic statement was
rated as significantly (ps < .001) moremoral (M = 6.62, SD = .78) compared to the other
two and that the exclusion of women (M = 6.21, SD = 1.18)was considered significantly
moremoral than the founding of Islamic schools (M = 5.53, SD = 1.43), F(3, 215) = 6.32,
p < .001 (Pillai’s).
Next to the scenario, the vignettes included arguments referring to core values such as
social order and civil liberties. In the ‘contra argument’ condition, scenarios were framed
in terms of social order or equality, whereas in the ‘pro argument’ condition, the scenario
was framed in terms of civil liberties. Both values were presented together in the ‘mixed
argument’ condition, and the control condition did not include any references to values.
Furthermore, the actors mentioned in the scenarios were either orthodox Protestant or
Muslim, resulting in a 2 (Target Group: orthodox Protestant vs. Muslim; between-
1 Based on previous research on framing of religious practices (Gieling et al., 2012) and research comparing support for Muslim
and Christians’ political representation (Verkuyten et al., 2016, Study 3), we expected a small effect size of f2 = .01. We set
statistical power to .95 implying that a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with eight groups and three dependent
variables requires a total sample size of 1,048 to detect effects at a significance level of a = .05. The actual sample was
somewhat larger due to questions included in the survey by other researchers.
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subjects) 9 4 (Framing: Pro argument vs. contra argument vs. mixed arguments vs. no
argument; between-subjects) 9 3 (Practice: founding of religious schools vs. exclusion of
women vs. homophobic statement; within-subjects) design. The scenarios were as
follows:
(1) (Freedomof education is very important in our society [pro]. It is very important that
children can integrate in society and this is best achieved with mixed schools
[contra].) Someorganizations are founding [Islamic/strict Protestant] schoolswhere
only [Muslim/orthodox Protestant] children are accepted. What should the
government do about these schools?
(2) (Freedom of speech is very important in our society [pro]. It is very important not to
hurt or insult other people groundlessly [contra].) A(n) [Imam/priest of an orthodox
Protestant church] recently gave a speech in which he stated that gays and lesbians
are inferior human beings. What should the [Mosque/Church] administration do
about it?
(3) (Freedom of assembly is very important in our society [pro]. Equality of man and
woman is a crucial value [contra].) Recently, there was a discussion about someone
who was not accepted in the administration of a [Mosque/strict Protestant church]
because she is a woman. What should the congregation do about it?
Measures
Tolerance
After reading each vignette and based on previous research (see Gieling et al., 2010;
Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007), participants indicated their tolerance for the scenario
choosing between the following possible actions of the responsible authorities: (1) ‘do
nothing and simply allow it’, (2) ‘try to convince themnot to do it, but allow it if they don’t
agree’, (3) ‘in between’, (4) ‘try to convince them not to do it, but forbid it if they don’t
agree’, and (5) ‘simply forbid it’. We focused on participants’ view about what the
responsible authorities should do because the exercise of tolerance presupposes the
power to interfere and participants themselves are not in a position to do so but they can
appeal to authorities to act (Horton, 1996; Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). The scales
were subsequently reversed so higher values reflected more tolerance. Although strictly
speaking the scale consisted of five answer categories that are logically arranged in a
meaningful order, we treated it as a continuous measure. In two experimental studies
using similar vignettes and the same response scale, it was found that the findings are
similar when using a continuous or ordinal measurement scale approach (Sleijper, 2018).
Participants also indicated their feelings towards each scenario (3 ‘very negative’ to 3
‘very positive’), which allows us to investigate whether the reactions to the scenarios are
indeed a matter of tolerance (i.e., acceptance of disapproved practices) and whether the
three scenarios do indeed differ in the negative feelings that they elicit.
Method of analysis
Preliminary analyses and randomization checks were performed to determine the
necessity of control variables. Randomization checks suggested to control for Protestant
affiliation because Protestants were not equally distributed across the eight experimental
conditions, Pearson v2(7) = 14.10, p = .05. There were no differences (ps > .50)
between experimental conditions in the distribution of gender, age, education, and
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political self-placement. Thus, only the variable Protestant affiliation (1 vs. not
Protestant = 0) and its interaction with target group condition were included as control
variable.
We first performed a between-subjects multivariate regression analysis on tolerance
ratings for each one of the three scenarios. Independent variables were target group and
framing conditions. Since therewere nomissing values in the data,multivariate regression
analysis is an appropriate method of analysis because it does not assume sphericity and
yields high power aswell as low chances of type I error for complete data (Gueorguieva &
Krystal, 2004). Furthermore, multivariate regression analysis may be performed despite
the skewed distribution of the dependent variables as it is relatively robust against
violations of multivariate normality (Finch, 2005). We examined the assumption of
homogeneity of variance–covariance matrices with a Box M test that yielded significant
results, F(42, 2374510.7) = 3.53, p < .001. The violation of the assumption was
accepted, as cells with larger sample sizes mostly produced larger variances and
covariances than cells with smaller sample sizes yielding a conservative estimation of the
alpha level (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).2 We compared coefficients across tolerance
outcomes using the Wald tests (Kodde & Palm, 1986).
Results
Descriptive findings
We first examined whether participants generally felt negative about the practices
depicted in the three scenarios. About three quarters of the participants expressed
negative feelings about founding of religious schools (M = 1.47, SD = 1.43) and
exclusion of women (M = 1.92; SD = 1.40). Concerning the homophobic statement,
negative feelingswere evenmorewidespreadwith 94.5%of the participants disapproving
such statements (M = 2.44, SD = .91). For all three scenarios, mean scores of feelings
were well below the neutral zero mid-point of the scale, ps < .001, and even below the
score of 1, ps < .001. Feelings towards the three practices were moderately correlated
(r = 0.41 to 0.48).3
Explaining tolerance
Average tolerance varied considerably across practices (see Table 1). A series of Wald
tests revealed that the intercepts (see Table 2, columns 2–4) differed significantly from
each other for all pairwise comparisons, F(1, 1,218) > 21.02, p < .001. As expected,
participants were least tolerant of a homophobic statement andmost tolerant of founding
religious schools, with the exclusion of women in between. Further, results indicate a
significant overall effect of target group, F(3, 1,216) = 54.68, p < .001, gp
2 = .12, with
practices being tolerated less when committed by Muslims compared to orthodox
Protestants (see Table 1). As expected, tolerance ratings were significantly lower when
2 As is common in national surveys, several other researchers had included other measures that are not directly relevant for and
not meant to consider in the current study (e.g., on social trust, contact with ethnic minority groups, partisanship). In a prior, but
separate and unrelated, part of the questionnaire, participants were also presented with another experiment. Therefore, we
tested for carry-over effects. In a preliminary analysis, the other experiment was used as dummy variable in the analyses of the
responses to the tolerance experiment. This factor was not (either individually or in combination) related to the outcomes of the
current experiment (ps > .40), indicating that there are no problematic carry-over effects.
3 Furthermore, for the three practices the associations between the tolerance scale and the continuous ‘feeling’ scale were quite
strong (>0.43 and <0.69).
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religious schools were founded by Muslims compared to orthodox Protestants, whereas
tolerance ratings of a homophobic statement (moral principle of harm) and the exclusion
of women (principle of equality) did not differ significantly between Muslims and
orthodox Protestants (see Table 2, column 2–4 for results of the multivariate regression
estimating effects on each tolerance outcome, separately).
Arguments
Overall, therewas a small and onlymarginally significant effect for framing condition, F(9,
3,654) = 1.92, p = .05, gp
2 = .005. Furthermore, for the three separate practices, the
evidence for the effects of arguments in favour or against tolerance isweak andmixed (see
Table 1). A positive effect of a pro argument on tolerance was only found for the scenario
of a homophobic statement (Table 2, column 4). Compared to the control condition (no
argument), participants displayed higher levels of tolerance when they read a pro
tolerance argument. Additionally, participants tolerated the exclusion of women
somewhat less when they read a contra tolerance argument (Table 2, column 3). Further,
the results indicate that mixed arguments (favouring and opposing combined) did not
have an effect on the level of tolerance of the three practices.4
Protestant participants
In general, participants belonging to a Protestant denomination were more positive
(M = 1.26, SD = 1.21) towards the different practices as compared to non-religious
participants and participants belonging to another denomination (M = 2.03, SD = .84),
F(3, 1,221) = 51.70, p < .001, g2 = .11. Compared to non-Protestant participants,
Protestant participants also exhibited higher levels of acceptance towards the practices,
F(3, 1,216) = 29.24, p < .001,gp
2 = .07. This was especially the casewhen the practices
were performed by orthodox Protestants as indicated by a significant negative interaction
effect between Protestant affiliation and target group, F(3, 1,216) = 7.22, p = .001,
Table 1. Tolerance ratings by experimental conditions and practices
Religious schools Exclusion of women Homophobic statement
NM SD M SD M SD
Overall 2.407 1.390 2.308 1.381 1.553 .934 1,225
Target group condition
Protestant 2.85 1.44 2.29 1.44 1.65 1.06 621
Muslim 1.95 1.77 2.32 1.31 1.45 .78 604
Framing condition
Control 2.41 1.41 2.41 1.44 1.45 .90 315
Pro argument 2.41 1.41 2.28 1.38 1.61 .95 306
Contra argument 2.38 1.37 2.14 1.30 1.51 .87 288
Both arguments 2.43 1.38 2.38 1.38 1.63 1.00 316
Religion
Protestant affiliation 2.886 1.443 2.882 1.446 1.795 1.104 297
No or other affiliation 2.253 1.338 2.124 1.308 1.476 .860 928
4We also examined whether there were three-way interaction effects between group, practice, and argument. While there were
some marginally significant effects, no clear pattern of findings was found.
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2 = .02. This interaction effect was found for all three practices, but appeared
especially strong for the religious schools and less so for the exclusion of women and the
homophobic statement (Table 2, columns 2–4).
The finding that participants with Protestant affiliation exhibited higher acceptance
when practices are performed by orthodox Protestants compared to Muslims may also
hold for Christians in general whoweremore positive towards the practices (M = 1.54,
SD = 1.13) than non-religious participants (M = 2.08, SD = .81), F(3, 1,221) = 31.49,
p < .001, g2 = .07. Therefore, Protestant affiliation and its interaction with target group
were replaced by Christian affiliation and the respective interaction with target group in
an additional multivariate regression analysis. As compared to non-Christians, Christians
were more accepting when practices were performed by orthodox Protestants than
Muslims. Thus, biased acceptance judgements based on the target group were not
particular to Protestants but held for Christians in general. This result might be due to the
fact that Protestants, and Christians, more generally, are more positive towards the
different practices when performed by orthodox Protestants, which would mean that
their acceptance is less a matter of tolerance (objectionwithout interference). Therefore,
we conducted additional analyses that are reported below.
Additional analysis
The sample used for the main analysis included a small share of participants that had
positive feelings towards the practices, which indicates that for them the issue is not a
question of toleration. An additional multivariate regression analysis was performed
including only participants who displayed negative or neutral feelings towards the three
practices (N = 1,079).5 Results are similar to the main analyses, with the exception that
the interactions of Protestant affiliation and target group were non-significant for
tolerance of the exclusion of women and the homophobic statement. These different
results can be attributed to the fact that half of the participants with positive feelings
towards the practices performed by orthodox Protestants were themselves Protestants.
These participants with positive feelings were included in themain analysis but not in the
additional analysis. Thus, the additional analyses indicate that Protestants who express
positive feelings towards the practices performed by Protestants drive the interaction
effects observed in the main analysis.
Discussion
In many Western societies, there have been heated debates about the accommodation of
specific cultural and religious norms and practices within society. Some argue that
opposition to minority practices (e.g., by Muslims in the west) indicates general dislike
and prejudice (Spruyt & Elcharus, 2012), whereas others claim that it can be a question of
disapproval based on general principles (Sniderman&Hagendoorn, 2007).We compared
tolerance of three controversial practices performed by either Muslims (a culturally
dissimilar group) or orthodox Protestants (a culturally similar group). This allowed us to
assess whether Muslim practices are tolerated less and whether this depends on the
5 Similar results were also found in a further multivariate regression analysis including only participants who displayed negative
(>0; so no neutral) feelings towards the three practices. Furthermore, in other experimental research it has also been found that
the findings are similar for the full sample and a subsample which is explicitly negative about the practices (Sleijper, 2018).
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nature of the particular practice. Our findings demonstrate that differential toleration of
Muslimpracticesmay depend on the extent towhich the practice evokesmoral concerns.
First, participants were most negative and least tolerant of a homophobic statement
that challenges moral norms of preventing harm and equal respect. Participants were less
negative and somewhat more tolerant towards the exclusion of women from a religious
board. The tolerance for the founding of religious schools was highest. These findings
support previous research that demonstrated that these three practices differ in how
strongly they raise moral concerns (Gieling et al., 2010; Van Doorn, 2015; Verkuyten &
Slooter, 2007) which we also found in our post-hoc study on a national sample. Research
in social domain theory (Turiel, 2002) and on moral convictions (Skitka & Morgan, 2014)
indicates that people perceive their moral beliefs to be objectively and universally true
making something wrong independent of who is doing it. In line with this, we found that
participants were less tolerant of Muslims (vs. orthodox Protestants) founding separate
religious schools (an issue low in moral concern), but that there was no difference in
tolerance for the homophobic statement and exclusion of women (the issues of greater
moral concern) regardless of whether these were done by a Muslim or orthodox
Protestant. According to Hurwitz and Mondak (2002), threat perceptions and group
affiliations tend to be irrelevant to tolerance of highly offensive acts as they are rejected
under all circumstances. In Dutch society, calling gays and lesbians inferior people and
excluding women go against important moral principles (Dagevos, Andriessen, &
Vervoort, 2016) and are not tolerated, neither for Muslims nor orthodox Protestants.
Interestingly, tolerance did not systematically depend on the presentation of pro,
contra, or mixed arguments for accepting the practices. As compared to when no
arguments were made, pointing out a value favouring tolerance only increased tolerance
of the homophobic statement. Similarly, only tolerance for the exclusion of women was
found to be lower when an argument against the practice was presented. Presenting a
mixture of pro and contra arguments did not have any clear effects, which has also been
found in other research (Brewer & Gross, 2005; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). There are
at least two possible explanations for these findings.
First, due to floor effects, framing may not decrease tolerance in the case of highly
offensive practices that evoke very strong objection such as making a homophobic
statement or excluding women (Slothuus, 2008). Strong attitudes are relatively resistant
to arguments and framing effects and difficult to change (Howe & Krosnick, 2017;
Lecheler et al., 2009). This is especially the casewhen attitudes are based onmoral beliefs
that tend to be considered objective and universal (Skitka & Morgan, 2014).
Second, framing effects may only be observed in the case of strong arguments (Chong
& Druckman, 2007) and the persuasiveness of the arguments used in the experiment
might not have been strong enough. Only referring to core values related to the
controversial practices may not suffice to alter considerations, especially since partici-
pants’ attention span may be relatively low when completing online questionnaires.
Additionally, convincing the intolerant to become tolerant is quite difficult (Gibson, 2006)
and therefore might require the use of vivid framing methods such as videos and
newspaper articles with emotional appeals (Chong & Druckman, 2007).
Limitations and future directions
There are some limitations to the current study, which may be addressed in future
research. For example,whilewe focused on concrete cases rather than abstract principles
and used realistic and debated issues instead of unfamiliar and hypothetical scenarios, we
206 Magdalena Hirsch et al.
were only able to examine tolerance of three practices. Future research could focus on
other practices that clearly differ in terms of the moral concerns that they elicit, and
measuremoral convictions in addition to, for example, attitude strength (Skitka&Morgan,
2014). Furthermore, future work could assess individuals’ actual experiences with the
particular practices and one’s knowledge of them. It would also be useful to examine the
individual endorsement of, for example, free speech and the importance attached to
public order and social cohesion (Peffley, Knigge, &Hurwitz, 2001). For example, people
can clearly prioritize one value over another, but experiences of value conflict are also
possible because competing values are simultaneously considered equally important.
Additionally, while we focused on the importance of the religious group and specific
practices and arguments for tolerance, future studies could examine other dimensions
that are likely to be important. For example, the sense inwhich people are expected to be
tolerant (social, political), the social implications of tolerance, and the underlying beliefs
(e.g., informational, cultural, moral) of the people engaged in the disapproved practices
might all be relevant to study. Practices that are more visible and that have more far-
reaching societal consequencesmight be less tolerated, and dissenting practices based on
other informational beliefs compared to other moral beliefs might be tolerated more
(Ellemers, 2017; Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007).
Furthermore, participants were asked what responsible authorities should do about
specific practices because tolerance typically implies the power to prohibit or seriously
interfere with conduct that one finds objectionable (Horton, 1996). However, apart from
the controversial nature of the practices, participants might have other reasons (e.g., anti-
government, anti-authority) for why they think that responsible authorities should (not)
take steps against specific practices. Yet, this would not explain that the three practices
were not tolerated similarly and that participants expressed less tolerance for some
practices when associated with Muslims than orthodox Protestants.
Finally, it could be argued that the five response options to measure tolerance
constitute separate categories rather than a continuous scale. However, the categories
have been treated as a continuous scale in previous studies (e.g., Gieling et al., 2010;
Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007), the scale is strongly related to the continuous ‘feeling’
measure (note 2), and research has demonstrated that the findings are not sensitive to
treating the measure as a continuous or an ordinal scale (Sleijper, 2018). Future research
may, however, benefit fromusing a different Likert-type format or develop amore detailed
understanding of the different possible meanings of the response categories used to
measure tolerance.
Conclusion
In contrast to existing research on tolerance ofminority practices (e.g., Van derNol, 2014;
Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007), here we have compared tolerance of different practices
enacted by culturally similar versus dissimilar groups. This systematic comparison
allowed us to assess whether opposition towards minority (Muslim) practices is not just a
question of dislike and prejudice towards the group (discriminatory tolerance), but can
also involve disapproval of specific practices independent of the actor (generic
tolerance). The findings support the notion that (in)tolerance and prejudicial attitudes
are distinct phenomena (e.g., Crawford, 2014; Klein & Zick, 2013; Van der Noll, 2010).
Social psychological research tends to equate tolerance with openness, being well
disposed towards cultural others, or having a generalized positive attitude towards them
(see Verkuyten &Yogeeswaran, 2017). In this understanding, tolerance is the opposite of
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dislike, disapproval, or prejudicial attitude. By contrast, the classical understanding of
tolerance involves putting upwith something that one disapproves of or is negative about.
Tolerance keeps negative attitudes and beliefs from becoming negative actions and
thereby makes living with differences possible. A diverse and peaceful society does not
require thatwe all like each other, but it does necessarilymean that people have learned to
tolerate one another.We have to agree how to disagree, and social psychological research
should make an important contribution to our understanding of how people think about
different types of provocative practices and develop tolerant and intolerant judgements.
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